

**Both In One Trench:
Saddam's Secret Terror Documents**

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ISBN: 1-4196-7866-3

ISBN-13: 9781419678660

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Ray Robison

For our families, for those who served, those who will serve and most importantly those who left life and limb in desperate, lonely places to help others find freedom. God bless America's warriors and their loved ones.

Special thanks to our agent Don Gastworth. Also thanks to those whose work encouraged us to keep digging for the truth: Dr. Laurie Mylroie, Christopher Hitchens, Stephen Hayes, and the editors and talent of Fox News Channel and Fox News.com, American Thinker, and Pajamas Media.

Note: Because this book is the product of a grass roots effort with limited resources the authors have not been able to provide a professionally edited manuscript at this time. It is our hope that sales of this book will allow us to increase the quality so that the best version possible will be available to the public in the future. If the reader feels a need to write us about a grammatical error please wait until after we go to editing as any errors should be caught in the editing process.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION:	
WHY THE IRAQ DOCUMENTS MATTER	11
PART I: SADDAM AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM	
Chapter 1: The relevancy of Saddam's support of Islamic terrorism	23
Chapter 2: What the documents reveal about Saddam's support of Islamic terrorism	35
Chapter 3: Why Saddam supported Islamic terrorists	
Chapter 4: The IIS Agent's Notebook Part One	
Chapter 5: The IIS Agent's Notebook Part Two	
Chapter 6: The IIS Agent's Notebook Part Three	
Chapter 7: Payments to Afghan Mujahideen	
Chapter 8: Hamas in Iraq	
Chapter 9: The Insurgency Plan	
Chapter 10: How to remain Incognito in Afghanistan	
Chapter 11: The Mastermind of Mogadishu	
Chapter 12: Courting Usama bin Laden	
PART II: THE INTRIGUE OF SADDAM	
Chapter 13: Foreign Contacts and Influence	
Chapter 14: Anonymous source describes Iraqi activity before the war	
Chapter 15: Russian scientists in Iraq hide from UN	
Chapter 16: Saddam's anthrax attack warning	
Chapter 17: Saddam's nuclear test?	
Chapter 18: Saddam's Millennium Plot	
Chapter 19: Implications of Saddam's Support to Islamic Terrorism	

“There’s no question that Saddam Hussein had al-Qaeda ties.”

President George Bush

**Remarks by the President After Meeting with Members of the
Congressional Conference Committee on Energy Legislation.**

Office of the Press Secretary

September 17, 2003

www.whitehouse.gov

*“The evidence now shows clearly that Saddam did not
want to work with Osama bin Laden at all,
much less give him weapons of mass destruction.”*

Former Vice President Al Gore

Saddam’s al-Qaeda Connection

The Weekly Standard, Stephen F. Hayes

September 1, 2003, Volume 008, Issue 48

*“Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaeda
have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression...*

Baghdad’s links to terrorists will increase.”

Former C.I.A. Director George Tenet

**The Unknown: The C.I.A. and the Pentagon take another
look at Al Qaeda and Iraq.**

The New Yorker, Jeffrey Goldberg

Issue of February 10, 2003

*“I believe that the 9/11 report, the early evidence, is that they’re
going to indicate that we didn’t have the kind of terrorists
links that this administration was
asserting. I think that’s a very, very serious finding.”*

Sen. John Kerry

Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed

Washington Post, Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank

June 17, 2004

[Saddam Hussein] “had long-established ties with al Qaeda.”

Vice President Cheney

Al Qaeda-Hussein Link Is Dismissed

Washington Post, Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank

June 17, 2004

“There is evidence of exaggeration”

[of Iraq-al Qaeda links]

Sen. Carl Levin,

Saddam’s al Qaeda Connection

The Weekly Standard, Stephen F. Hayes

09/01/2003, Volume 008, Issue 48

INTRODUCTION

THE CHARGES AND countercharges surrounding the Iraq War are widely known. The American left through a mostly sympathetic media has persisted in the claim that the Bush Administration led the United States of America into an unnecessary war. They claim that Saddam had no stockpiles of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nothing to do with Islamic terrorism, and thus was not a threat to the United States. In their estimation the war against Saddam was a distraction from the Global War on Terror—a concept that they also mock while relegating Islamic terrorism to an issue of law enforcement with little or no military component.

They argue that Saddam was constrained to only subjugating 25 million people to horrendous brutality while acting as a destabilizing force in the Middle East and was not worth fighting. The Democrat position is weak enough without the revelations contained here. But with this work based on documents captured in Iraq and Afghanistan and supporting media reports it can be shown that the Democrat position is a fiction from beginning to end. The documents reveal that the Saddam regime was complicit in supporting the *global Islamic jihad movement* as a whole and specifically the Taliban and al Qaeda. As such, it was a major threat to the United States and Iraq was—under Saddam and after—a frontline in the war on terror.

Democratic leaders have tried to de-legitimize the Iraq War for years. Their strategy has been somewhat successful. Since December 2003, CBS News has conducted a regular poll that includes the following question: “Looking back, do you think the United States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq, or should the U.S. have stayed out?” Responses supporting the war in Iraq dropped from an initial sixty-three percent to forty-four percent in two and a half years. Since then, support for the Iraq war has declined even further. This decline in public approval was mirrored by a growing distrust of the Bush Administration.

The American public has been subjected to a nonstop cacophony of Democratic leaders and pundits in the media claiming the Saddam regime did not pose a genuine threat to the United States. This claim is somewhat supported by the fact that no significant WMD stocks were found in Iraq (some WMD was found but not that much). There is still reason to question at what point the regime divested itself of its WMD but Saddam didn't have it as of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19th, 2003 as far as we can tell. Thus, the Democrats claim that the Iraq war was superfluous.

President Bush and other administration officials spoke of intelligence failures. For left-wing activists the mantra soon became, “Bush Lied, People Died.” The more widespread criticism holds that the Bush administration was mistaken if not actually incompetent in its assessment of pre-war intelligence.

The reasons for war in Iraq are of paramount political and historical importance. The rest of the world may judge the United States by its' actions in Iraq for years to come. Now, for the first time, a new voice has arisen to contribute to the debate over the war against the Saddam Hussein regime. That voice comes from

Iraq's past and tells us what was happening in Iraq under Saddam. That voice is heard in the Saddam regime's internal documentation and it tells the story about the dictator's intent to expand his global sphere of influence by supporting Islamic terrorism. The voice also tells us that Saddam habitually refused to comply with his obligations under UN resolutions up until the end. Finally, the voice gives us a glimpse into Saddam's methods of manipulation to secure his power.

In 2005 a few hundred out of millions of documents that were captured in Iraq were made available to the public by the U.S. government. These documents may change the way some of the public perceives the war against Saddam Hussein and his regime. This collection of memorandums, audio tapes and video tapes provides evidence that the Saddam regime more closely resembled the image portrayed by President Bush than that portrayed by his detractors.

The rush to judgment regarding pre-war intelligence was based on a massive information gap which is now bit by bit being filled in. While there is no doubt that much of the prewar analysis concerning WMD was in error (a common risk of intelligence exploitation) the evidence provided here supports the prewar assessment that Saddam was a threat to the United States predominately because of his support to the *global Islamic jihad movement* as embodied by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The documents that were captured in Iraq and Afghanistan and kept from the American public in a U.S. intelligence database for years must now become part of the national (and international) debate over the wisdom and necessity of the Iraq War. They must also contribute to determining how the history of Saddam Hussein, the Iraq War and President George W. Bush will be written.

In the period leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, there was widespread concern—if not a general consensus—that Iraq had failed to meet its proscribed obligations under UN resolutions to destroy its pre-Gulf War WMD stockpiles. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a lengthy presentation to the United Nations (UN) concerning Saddam Hussein’s failure to turn over tons of WMD precursor materials. Many intelligence agencies abroad and even some UN officials strongly believed that Saddam was hiding older chemical or biological weapons that he agreed to destroy in order to end the Gulf War. Although less the subject of Bush Administration statements than is portrayed by the media the development of new large-scale military production programs including nuclear weapons was discussed.

Shortly after the toppling of the Saddam regime, the U.S. government began a program to exploit captured Iraqi documentation. The effort was led by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG—created for this purpose and others) and supported by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). The primary mission of this multi-agency effort was the search for WMD, to investigate regime links to and thereby gain intelligence on terrorists, and search for Lieutenant Commander Scott Speicher missing in action since the Gulf War.

The Iraqi insurgency began in earnest a few months after the toppling of the Saddam regime, causing intelligence officials to divert resources from exploiting historical records to support the fight. Thus while analysis of the Saddam documents was ongoing the level of effort was reduced even though the amount of captured documentation was voluminous. And while the effort was ongoing new documentation, such as jihadist propaganda stem-

ming from the strengthening insurgency, required an even further diversion of effort. Even without an insurgency it would have taken years to analyze the tens of thousands of video and audio tapes and millions of documents that required translation.

Yet within months of the overthrow of Saddam the U.S. government began turning out report after report that made determinations regarding Saddam’s pre-war activities. These reports noted U.S. intelligence mistakes. Consequently the media reported a steady stream of intelligence failures. Democratic leaders and numerous pundits claimed the Bush Administration had knowingly falsified the perception of the pre-war intelligence—and some even claimed it falsified the intelligence itself—to engender support for the war. Some leftwing and even a few rightwing commentators began to claim President Bush “cherry-picked the intelligence.” Those government reports and subsequently much of the public concluded that Saddam had no WMD and did not support Islamic terrorism thus was incapable of supplying WMD to Islamic terrorists a main concern of the administration. Lost somewhere in the discussion was the fact that the attacks of 9/11 were executed without WMD. Therefore, state sponsors of terrorism—along with the terrorists themselves—are a true danger ir- regardless of whether those states possess WMD.

In 2004, a few notable investigative journalists began to request the release of documentation captured from Iraq. Among them were Roger Simon of the blog alliance known as *Pajamas Media* and Stephen Hayes of the conservative journal *The Weekly Standard* who perhaps led the charge to urge release of Saddam’s documentation. Upon returning from Qatar where I spent a year working with the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) I first read Hayes’ work

and was astounded at his grasp of the situation. He quite accurately depicted the situation as millions of documents and limited resources. Hayes and others (including myself who joined the effort after completing my work with the ISG) called on the U.S. government to make the documents available to the general public for historical analysis.

My reason for urging the public release of the documents was simple. I saw video after video of atrocities committed by the Ba'athists. I read gists—summaries of the English translations of the original Arabic documents—and knew that the entire story of the Saddam regime wasn't getting out to the public. History may determine that Saddam Hussein had not retained significant WMD stockpiles but such is not the whole story of Saddam and Iraq.

The real story of Saddam Hussein is hidden in those documents. Saddam and his cronies had every reason to lie and keep secret their support to Islamic terrorism. But the authors of this book have reviewed Ba'athist documentation and found it contradictory to the claims of Democratic Party leadership, some high profile intelligence experts and Saddam Hussein.

The authors of this book have provided document translation and analysis to link several distinct documents that strongly parallel each other in content that in some cases is not available from other sources (a strong indicator of the genuineness of the documents). The authors have done their utmost to examine the validity of the documents and consider counter arguments to conclusions that are drawn here. The authors make findings but also suggest theories to answer questions raised by some of the records. Some of the theories are highly unconventional and are proposed as potential avenues for further investigation. After all, they are theories

and are not final conclusions. The authors distinguish between the two, conclusion and theory in the writing because critics will invariably and inevitably take theory out of context and purport it to be a claim that has been made by the authors.

Of course document validity is crucial. Having worked with such documents while with ISG definitely gives one of this book's authors the perspective to make some determinations about the physical appearance of these documents. But we did not rely on that alone. We researched media and government sources for conflicting or supporting evidence.

Document forging activity in Iraq was played up by some media organizations in a cynical attempt to throw doubt on all the documentation while the real story of document forgery is rather (no pun intended) insignificant and isolated. Most of the fake documents were easily identified and weeded out by government analysts. And being as Iraq was a closed society in absolute tumult following the overthrow of Saddam it seems likely that most people just had more important concerns than rushing out to the wreckage of a government office in order to plant forged documents. Furthermore, it is unlikely that many Iraqi citizens had the expertise to forge the internal documents of a closed government that did not make its correspondence available to the public—a necessity because a potential forger would at the very least have to know what such a document should look like. In the end it will be up to the reader to determine for himself or herself as to whether or not the information provided here should be believed or even if it adds to the understanding of the cause for war.

The following pages will provide evidence to support the aforementioned conclusions about the Saddam regime. Those conclu-

sions can be summarized as follows:

1. The Saddam regime supported Islamic terrorists the same as it supported other 'secular' terrorists. The key to understanding this issue is the logical distinction between working with Islamic extremists to achieve mutual objectives outside of Iraq versus having them exist uncontrolled inside Iraq. Saddam's regime was "open for business" to leaders from al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, Hamas, Afghani warlords and other Islamic extremist organizations. A singular instance or two of the Saddam regime meeting with Islamic terrorist leaders could possibly be discounted in the overall scheme of things. However, document after document indicates that Saddam's strategy was to support Islamic terrorists to achieve mutual objectives. His embrace of Islamic extremists at odds with his supposedly secular regime was a survival technique.
2. Documents provide strong evidence that Saddam was the instigator and ultimately behind the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. They also provide evidence to suspect that Saddam was complicit in the Millennium Plot as executed by al Qaeda against the United States. Furthermore, documents reveal what may be foreknowledge by Saddam of the American anthrax attack that occurred within days of 9/11.
3. Saddam was in material breach of UN resolutions. The authorization from Congress for the use of force in Iraq was based largely on the failure of the Saddam regime to comply with its obligations under agreement to the UN. This fact is salient: the Saddam regime was

- in a state of noncompliance. But while WMD a significant part of the argument before the war it was never the sole justification despite cynical attempts by historical revisionists to portray it as the only justification provided by the Bush Administration.
4. Saddam corrupted mightily. He used unwitting dupes to spread his propaganda. His intelligence agencies claimed to have sources all over the world in sensitive organizations including the UN and the American media.
 5. There are indications of activities in Iraq that we cannot make full determination on at this time but which raise interesting questions. Even though we cannot make conclusions we will pass the relevant information to the reader who may draw his or her own conclusions. For instance, a report by a respected journalist about a claim of an Iraqi underground nuclear test that happened in the late 1980's appears to have sparked concern within the Saddam regime. The internal memorandum shows active steps to conceal evidence related to the story.
 6. For the sake of history we make the startling revelation that during President Bush's 2006 State of the Union Address a former spy for Saddam Hussein sat with the First Lady, Laura Bush. It should be noted that it was practically impossible to know this and at the time the man was a leader of the Afghan reform movement that supported the overthrow of the Taliban. There are many reasons why an Afghani might have been on Saddam's payroll; this alone does not

automatically imply hostile intent against the U.S.. Indeed, subsequent to the overthrow of the Taliban the man has been fully supportive of the U.S.. Nevertheless, according to Saddam's documentation the man is specifically named as being on his intelligence service's payroll.

Each chapter in the body of this book will focus on a document or set of related documents. An impression of the original Arabic document is provided when available along with an English translation. It must be noted that since the writing of this book began some of the electronic copies of original Saddam regime documents have been removed from public viewing. Although these documents were originally posted on a Department of Defense website for public research the government has since shut down the site and the original may no longer be available for reproduction here.

The *New York Times* reported just before the 2006 Congressional elections that members of the International Atomic Energy Agency complained about some of Saddam's nuclear documents posted at the website. Apparently they contained sensitive nuclear information. The website was shut down to keep this information out of the wrong hands,. At the time of this writing it is not clear whether the site will reopen, but it appears unlikely given the Democratic Party's control of Congress. When the original is no longer available to the authors we will post the translation that was made prior to the shut-down of the website. We will also provide the administrative number that identifies the document should the U.S. government reopen the website at a later date or should a researcher desire to obtain those manuscripts through a Freedom of Information Act request.

It is a great irony that although *The New York Times* has ridiculed the work of private researchers on this matter, questioned the validity of the documents, and reported that there was nothing new in these documents, it subsequently expressed concern about Saddam's nuclear documents online. It is humorous that *The New York Times* unintentionally validated these documents and proved that they are a source of new and interesting information after all. The Saddam regime failed to comply with the UN mandates to turn over all WMD related documentation because nuclear weapons designs were discovered amid Saddam's documents that were posted on the government website. *The New York Times'* article makes no mention of the fact that the very existence of these captured documents provides further evidence that Saddam was in material breach of his obligation under United Nations resolutions. The *Times* somehow failed to mention in its own reporting that it had just substantiated the Bush Administration's argument that Iraq had failed to comply with UN resolutions regarding WMD.

It is also worth noting that although *The New York Times* has systematically called for the release of America's classified information and taken it upon itself to release classified U.S. intelligence it has consistently sought to befuddle attempts to delve into Saddam's secrets. One has to wonder about the motivation of an American news organization that cares more about keeping Saddam's secrets than our own. In addition, it should be noted that the same reporters who wrote an article to embarrass the Bush Administration over the incidental release of Saddam's prohibited nuclear documentation—which was ultimately a process error by an analyst—has failed to report on many of the documents included here. They had the same access as the authors of this

book and apparently only lacked the motivation to discover and report Saddam's secrets.

This work will examine related news and government reports for context to see how the documents expand our knowledge. It should be noted that this book is not intended to be a compendium of every bit of evidence in the public domain related to a specific subject, but rather it is a review of Saddam regime (and some al-Qaeda) documentation and relevant media reporting. The most exciting part of this book is that much of the documentation is self-evident with a little background research. The reader will find documents that counter everything the media (with the exception of *Fox News Channel*, *The Weekly Standard*, *The American Thinker*, *The Cyber News Service*, *The American Spectator*, *Pajamas Media* and a few other sources such as radio pundit Rush Limbaugh) has told the public—or that demonstrate what the Democratic leadership via the sympathetic media has failed to tell the American people. The reader will see not only the difference, but may begin to re-evaluate the stranglehold the professional media has on information in the public domain and how that information is presented through the lens of a journalist's or news organization's own bias.

— *Ray Robison*

CHAPTER 1: THE RELEVANCY OF SADDAM'S SUPPORT OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM

ONE OF THE primary justifications given by the Bush administration and Congressional supporters for the invasion of Iraq and removal of the Saddam regime was the regime's support to terrorism. The President and his supporters claimed that Saddam Hussein supported terrorism and was thus a legitimate target in the Global War on Terror. The Congressional document that authorized the war in Iraq specifically outlined the multiple reasons to go to war. The words *terrorism* or *terrorists* are included sixteen times in the justifications portion of the authorization. By comparison, the word *weapon(s)* in reference to weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, or nuclear—is used fifteen times. The authorization shows that terrorism was at least as important to the case against the Saddam regime as WMD. The paragraphs of the justification that refer to terrorism are presented below:

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other interna-

tional terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks

that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40);

This legislation, entitled the *Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq* was passed by Congress and signed by the President in October of 2002. It was approved by a near unanimous Republican vote in the House and Senate. Forty-three percent of Congressional Democrats voted in favor of this authorization for war.

At the time of the debate over the authorization legislation leading Democrats were supportive of the resolution because, as they stated, Saddam supported terrorism. Senator Hillary Clinton said on the Floor of the Senate "He [Saddam Hussein] has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members."

Senator John Kerry, in a speech from the Senate floor, made the case that the Bush administration and the previous Clinton Administration had been too lax with the Saddam regime. Kerry connected Iraq's support of terrorism to 9/11:

Later in the year, [1998] Congress enacted legislation declaring Iraq in material, unacceptable breach of its disarmament obligations and urging the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance. In fact, had we done so, President Bush could well have taken his office, backed by our sense of urgency about holding Saddam Hussein accountable and, with an international United Nations, backed a multilateral stamp of approval record on a clear demand for the disarmament of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. We could have had that and we would not be here debating this today. But the administration missed an opportunity 2 years ago and particularly a year ago after September 11th. They regrettably, and even clumsily, complicated their own case. The events of September 11th created new understanding of the terrorist threat and the degree to which every nation is vulnerable. That understanding enabled the administration to form a broad and impressive coalition against terrorism. Had the administration tried then to capitalize on this unity of spirit to build a coalition to disarm Iraq, we would not be here in the pressing days before an election, late in this year, debating this now. The administration's decision to engage on this issue now, rather than a year ago or earlier, and the manner in which it has engaged, has politicized and complicated the national debate and raised questions about the credibility of their case.

According to the October of 2002 words of Senator Kerry, President Bush waited a year too long to build a coalition to disarm Iraq because of its state support for terrorism. Yet two years later,

September of 2004, John Kerry had this to say about Iraq and terrorism:

We owe it to the American people to have a real debate about the choices President Bush has made, and the choices I would make and have made, to fight and win the war on terror.

That means that we must have a great and honest debate on Iraq. The president claims it is the centerpiece of his war on terror. In fact, Iraq was a profound diversion from that war and the battle against our greatest enemy.

The words 'diversion' and 'distraction' now pepper the statements of many Democratic leaders such as Howard Dean, Nancy Pelosi and John Edwards in their discussion of the war in Iraq and its relationship to the *Global War on Terror*.

How did we come to this division of opinion about whether or not Saddam Hussein supported terrorism? How is it that a U.S. Senator can take a Presidential administration to task for not moving against Iraq's sponsorship of terrorism related to 9/11 and then a few years later claim that such action was a distraction from fighting terrorism?

Without trying to specifically delve into the motivations of a U.S. Senator who was the Democratic Presidential nominee at the time he disassociated Iraq from the war on terror, what were the stated reasons for this change of course as outlined by the Democratic leadership? Part of the answer can be found in the distinction between al-Qaeda, Islamic terrorism, and the general concept of terrorism. As the war in Iraq dragged on (and indeed a few voices from before the war), the Democratic opposition be-

gan to distinguish between Saddam's general support to terrorism and support of al Qaeda.

The argument of many Democratic leaders became that even though it is clear Saddam supported terrorism his support did not include al Qaeda or those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Even further, the argument has become that Saddam had no inclination to support *Islamic-based* terrorism what so ever. And since the greatest terroristic threat to the United States is posed by Islamic terrorists, or those Muslims who find justification for their actions in the Quran rather than political ideology, Saddam could be disassociated from their attacks against the United States. Thus they argued Saddam was not a part of the *Global War on Terror*. In other words Iraq is the wrong war because Saddam supported the wrong terrorists.

The ramifications of this distinction as argued by the Democratic opposition ranges from accusations that the President "cherry-picked" the intelligence, suppressed intelligence that was counter to its argument and even lied about the relationship of Saddam Hussein to Islamic terrorism.

The Democratic leadership and the media have subsequently seized upon a slew of U.S. government reports to substantiate this differentiation (many of these reports are of their own making). Although U.S. government reports over the past decade show a clear and overwhelming pattern of support to terrorism by the Saddam regime those reports deal mainly with *secular terrorists* or terrorists who happen to be Muslims but claim to be motivated by politics instead of religion. The theory here is that these groups are focused on various governments in the Middle East and thus are not a threat to the United States. Their political based violence is limited by geographical boundaries versus theo-

cratic ones. In contrast the religious terrorist considers the whole world a battlefield. An Islamic terrorist will kill Christians wherever they may be found and thus poses a threat to the United States. The Islamic terrorist wants a clash of civilizations and poses a threat to the world.

We are supposed to ignore the fact that these same Arabic 'nationalistic' anti-government movements tend to have Islamic characteristics and tend to spawn other movements that become international and threaten the U.S. such as how the Muslim Brotherhood spawned the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the National Islamic Front in Sudan and Hamas. Nevertheless, Democratic leadership made a distinction and their argument is based upon this distinction.

Reports from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 9/11 Commission indicated that there was contact and attempted collaboration between al-Qaeda and the Saddam regime, but there was no conclusive evidence of an operational relationship. The reports say that they may have talked about working together, but there is no solid evidence that they did. Given that there are indications of attempted collaboration if we want to find the truth we must ask questions. Does the evidence lead us to believe that these contacts led to an operational relationship? Given what we know is it reasonable to suspect they would work together? Did Saddam support Islamic terrorists? Was his regime a legitimate target in the *Global War on Terror*? This is the gray area that entangles the political and rhetorical arguments that surround the war in Iraq.

In response to these questions, certain political, diplomatic and intelligence professionals have stated that the Saddam regime would not work with Islamic terrorists because they were a

threat to his regime and because the two sides were ideologically opposed. Thus not only is there no solid evidence that Saddam worked with them they also say he couldn't work with them because they were his enemy.

If the very possibility of an operational relationship between the Saddam regime and Islamic terrorists can be precluded then there is no reason to believe Saddam would support al-Qaeda. Such a case would be a sound refutation of the Bush Administration and Iraq war supporters. In practice this argument has become so convoluted that actual evidence has become secondary to the rhetorical argument made by the Democratic congressional leadership. Actual evidence of Saddam's support to Islamic terrorism is dismissed because 'he wouldn't have supported Islamic terrorism because of the ideological separation between his Ba'athist regime and Islamic terrorism.' Thus, no evidence can be accurate, authentic or real enough to overcome the rhetorical argument.

It is this aspect of the political debate that these documents illuminate. It is here that these documents matter. The evidence provided here shows that the Democratic leadership and the cooperative elements of the media have clearly overreached with their extended argument. This argument began by bashing the Bush Administration for not moving against Iraq because of terrorism and then made the leap of calling Iraq a distraction from the *Global War on Terror*.

These documents provide evidence of a clear and consistent trend of support from Islamic terror groups to the Saddam regime and its reciprocation. While the Senate Intelligence Committee was writing reports which quoted from Saddam Hussein's own words as evidence that he would not work with Islamic ter-

rorists, private citizens were translating documents that show the true nature of this relationship. Whereas Democratic leadership in the Senate expects the American public to take Saddam Hussein at his word to back their rhetorical arguments, researchers are looking at the real record of Saddam's government—the regime's own records. The captured documents provide a substantially different view to that of the Senate Intelligence Committee and it is a devastating indictment of that committee. Clearly, national security has been overcome by political posturing within the Senate and as such threatens the very citizenry it is charged with protecting.

The Senate Intelligence Committee had this to say in its Phase II report on prewar intelligence concerning Iraq:

Conclusion 1: Postwar findings indicate that the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) assessment that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa'ida resembled "two independent actors trying to exploit each other," accurately characterized bin Ladin's actions, but not those of Saddam Hussein. Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa'ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qa'ida to provide material or operational support.

The documents included here will show this finding by the Senate Intelligence Committee to be nothing other than absurd. If anything, Saddam was chasing a recalcitrant Usama bin Laden who was surrounded by other jihad leaders who had a relationship to Saddam.

Conclusion 2: Postwar findings have identified only one meeting between representatives of al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein's regime reported in prewar intelligence assessments. Postwar findings have identified two occasions, not reported prior to the war, in which Saddam Hussein rebuffed meeting requests from an al-Qa'ida operative. The Intelligence Community has not found any other evidence of meetings between al-Qa'ida and Iraq. (Ibid)

Whereas the Senate Intelligence Committee makes or rather fails to make distinctions to mislead the public about the true nature of the Saddam regime, this book gives the reader the raw evidence. The fact is that the Saddam regime was in consistent contact and provided support to al-Qaeda through third party affiliates and subordinate commanders. Usama bin Laden might not have been a contact for Saddam but he didn't need to be. The Senate Intelligence Committee relies on the fact that al-Qaeda was not al-Qaeda as it is now known to make its' conclusions. But there is strong evidence that Saddam worked repeatedly with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad which would join with bin Laden's followers to become the al Qaeda we know today. Therefore, the committee finds no evidence of an al Qaeda relationship even though al Qaeda's 'number two man' as he is commonly known, Ayman al Zawahiri had an operational relationship with the Saddam regime. It is a distressing display of misdirection for such an esteemed committee. This work will analyze a set of documents in the public domain that were not considered by the Senate Intelligence Committee that provide compelling evidence that Saddam worked directly with al-Qaeda.

Conclusion 9: While document exploitation continues, additional reviews of documents recovered in Iraq are unlikely to provide information that would contradict the Committee's findings or conclusions. (Ibid)

This book provides a wealth of information not previously in the public domain.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has concluded that Saddam viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime. The plain truth is that the Intelligence Committee was correct in that Saddam had reason to fear Islamic extremists, but it failed to realize that the fear of Islamic extremism is exactly what spurred Saddam to support Islamic terrorists.

It is not too different from the position taken by the Saudi government which supported Usama bin Laden before 9/11. Usama was supported in order to placate him and keep him busy outside of Saudi Arabia.

It is the exact same technique that Saddam used to protect his regime. By supporting Islamic extremists in their terroristic activities he ensured they would leave his regime alone. It is popular for Democratic pundits to claim that there were no al Qaeda terrorists in Iraq before we got there. This raises the question: If these Islamic terrorists hated him so much, where was Iraq's 9/11? Why did they not attack Iraq? These documents make the answer obvious—because they were getting more from Saddam than they would have had they attacked him.