Embed from Ramadi

Michael Fumento is reporting from Ramadi. An amazing amount of inside info and discussion of media misreporting.   H/T Ace

Shortly after my last trip, the situation had deteriorated to a point where there was much discussion – prompted largely by false Los Angeles Times articles from correspondents reporting from the remoteness and comfort of a Baghdad hotel and from Washington – of a Fallujah-style attack on Ramadi. But this was never in the cards, being neither desirable nor possible. Indeed, there wasn't even an increase in troops, except during the short period of overlap in early June when 1st BCT had fully deployed and 2/28 hadn't completely left. 1st BCT comprises much of the 1st Armored Division's First Brigade, the 1-6th Infantry and 1 35th Armor. Other elements include Marines, engineers, part of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and part of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division. The Navy provides corpsmen (medics) and SEALs, while the Air Force also augments the force.

      Within weeks, 1st BCT did launch an offensive, but it moved slowly and relied far less on artillery and air support than did the Fallujah assault. Mechanized troops pushed north into the suburbs, cutting off two major entrances to Ramadi for the first time during the war. The enemy was chased into areas already patrolled by U.S. soldiers who knew the lay of the land better than he did. This provided breathing room for the next step – building additional Forward Operating Bases and outposts in the badlands.

   Patriquin and Lee described how coalition forces break down the "anti-Iraqi forces" – the forces opposing the elected government of Iraq – into four categories. First there are the unaffiliated foreign fighters. Second is al Qaeda in Iraq, comprising both local and foreign terrorists. Third are local resistance fighters who are generally disgruntled ex-Baathists trying to get back the good life. Fourth are organized criminals and smugglers who are just in it for the bucks. Al Qaeda in Iraq, though relatively small, "is a significant threat to area residents because of its use of suicide bombers," MacFarland said. Iraqis do not venerate suicide in the way some Muslim peoples do – or for that matter the way Japan did until quite recently. When al Qaeda came to town, said MacFarland, "they intimidated, through murder and other acts of violence, the people of Ramadi and forced them into their homes, away from their places of employment."

Comments

[Scott Malensek]

Hardly the description of Iraqi Freedom Fighter insurgents so often illustrated by the war's opponents "wouldn't you resist if Iraqis invaded Cleveland?" That comparison ain't even close, yet it's their theme, it's successful, and it's a gross distortion of reality.