Today, ABC News released an article detailing some of the newly released Iraq documents. Coincidentally, I had asked Sammi to translate one of these documents for us. ABC News, who I berated here for the "Saddam Tapes" report, seems to have done a good job here. The originial document is here (PDF) document number ISGZ-2004-028947.
Document dated March 23, 1997
A letter from the Iraqi intelligence service to directors and managers advising them to follow certain procedures in case of a search by the U.N. team, including:
Removing correspondence with the atomic energy and military industry departments concerning the prohibited weapons (proposals, research, studies, catalogs, etc.).
Removing prohibited materials and equipment, including documents and catalogs and making sure to clear labs and storages of any traces of chemical or biological materials that were previously used or stored.
Doing so through a committee which will decide whether to destroy the documents.
Removing files from computers.
The letter also advises them on how they should answer questions by U.N. team members. It says the intelligence service should be informed within one week about the progress made in discarding the documents.
(Editor's Note: This document is consistent with the Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, which described a pattern of deception and concealment on the part of Saddam Hussein's government towards the U.N. inspectors in the mid to late 90's. Hussein halted all cooperation with those inspectors and expelled them in October 1998.)
Any time you work with a "gist" of a translation, there is a risk that context will be missed. This is the full translation that Sammi performed. The parenthesis are his and the horrible formatting is mine.
IRAQI REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
SERVICE Secret, private and immediate
Date: 23rd of March 1997
To the respected general directors
It came to our attention that during the inspection of the directorate’s headquarter (most probably the HQ of Iraqi intelligence) by UN team (No 182) that they inquired about some of the matters related to the symbols of some directorates and their modus operandi. They were also inquiring about the activities (scope of work) of those directorates and were trying to find a link between their intelligence work and the nation’s (Iraq) activity in the military industry sector. In the purpose of preventing future (UN) teams, from establishing this link, and in case they search the service’s headquarter or regional directorates we found that it was necessary to be prepared to execute the following instructions as follows:
1- Review the archive and files and remove any letters (written communication), with the atomic agency, the office of military manufacturing or stations (offices) and directorates, related to forbidden weapons (Bids, research, studies, catalogues, tests, guest experts….etc.)
2- Removal and disposal of documents and reports related to the follow up of the special committee and investigation teams (most probably the UN) along with all letters (written communications) related to them (UN) that were sent to the different directorates.
3- Taking away of forbidden and dual purpose materials, systems and equipments along with documents, catalogues and related books from the technical sections and libraries. And ensure the purification of laboratories, storage places (warehouses) and work sites from traces of any chemical, biological or radioactive material that has been previously used or stored.
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Secret, private and immediate IRAQI REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
SERVICE Secret, private and immediate
4- The operation of removal or disposal of documents, reports and equipments takes place through the review of a special committee. This committee provides the necessary approvals for destroying or relocation of those documents, reports and equipments
5- Implement a constant method in dealing with the members of the inspection teams and never answer only if through a representative of the service in charge. In case they inquire about directorates and formations outside of the (intelligence) service the answer to all questions and inquiries will be general (not precise) since the scope of work is intelligence work (meaning Iraqis are not supposed to answer precisely any question they regard as directly related to their intelligence work). When faced with an inquiry of a secret topic the person in charge should go back to his superiors to have the appropriate answer.
6- M3 should inspect the computer sites, microfilms and computers along with inspecting the disks and retrieving the memories (probably hard disks) of the computers to transfer any information related to the above (above points) while coordinating with beneficiating parties (probably the different directorates related to the above information) for fear of being targeted in the future (by UN teams inspections).
Proceed with the work of all points mentioned and inform our directorate with what has been achieved in a week’s period since the publication of this notice.
Note: After the completion of all those steps this notice should be returned to our directorate.
Signature of M M6
23rd of March 1997
Secret, private and immediate
While parts of this may be suggestive, it is not conclusive. It does beg the question, why did Iraq still have to "relocate" equipment after 6 years of inspections? And why were they afraid of a link being made if they had been so diligent at following the U.N. resolutions as the left would have you believe? And when you ask that you have to wonder what they could have had after almost four years of no inspections from 1998 until 2002.
Sammi did a great job didn't he folks!
All original tranlsations by "Sammi" are copyrighted intellectual property of "Sammi" for purposes of print media publishing. Free use for internet sources.